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Abstract
Device-to-device (D2D) communication underlaying cellular networks allows mobile devices such as smart-
phones and tablets to use the licensed spectrum allocated to cellular services for direct peer-to-peer transmission.
D2D communication can use either one-hop transmission (i.e., D2D direct communication) or multi-hop cluster-
based transmission (i.e., in D2D local area networks). The D2D devices can compete or cooperate with each other
to reuse the radio resources in D2D networks. Therefore, resource allocation and access for D2D communication
can be treated as games. The theories behind these games provide a variety of mathematical tools to effectively
model and analyze the individual or group behaviors of D2D users. In addition, game models can provide distributed
solutions to the resource allocation problems for D2D communication. The aim of this article is to demonstrate the
applications of game-theoretic models to study the radio resource allocation issues in D2D communication. The
article also outlines several key open research directions.
I. INTRODUCTION
As more and more new multimedia rich services are becoming available to mobile users, there is an ever-
increasing demand for higher data rate wireless access. As a consequence, new wireless technologies such
as LTE (Long Term Evolution)/LTE-Advanced and WiMAX have been introduced. These technologies
are capable of providing high speed, large capacity, and guaranteed quality-of-service (QoS) mobile
services [1]. With technology evolution of cellular networks, new techniques, such as small cells, have
been also developed, which are able to improve network capacity by reducing cell size and effectively
controlling interference. However, most attempts still rely on the centralized network topology, which
requires mobile devices to communicate with an evolved Node B (eNB) or access point (AP). Such a
centralized network topology can easily suffer from congestion by a large number of communicating
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2devices. Also, the eNB and AP may not have complete information about transmission parameters among
devices, which is required to optimize the network performance.
As an alternative, the concept of device-to-device (D2D) communication has been recently introduced to
allow local peer-to-peer transmission among mobile devices bypassing the eNB and AP [2]. Specifically,
besides cellular operation, where the user equipments (UEs) can be served by the network via the eNB
in the LTE system, some UEs may communicate with each other directly over direct links for proximity-
based services [3]. The UE with D2D connections (i.e., a D2D user) is loosely controlled by the eNB. In
particular, the eNBs can control the radio resource allocation for the cellular and the D2D links (i.e., the
link between UE and eNB and the link between UEs, which we will refer to as cellular and D2D users,
respectively). Also, the eNBs can set constraints on the transmission parameters (e.g., transmit power) of
D2D users. The purpose of the constraints is to limit the interference experienced by the cellular users [4]
and satisfy their quality-of-service (QoS) requirements.
In this article, we classify D2D communication into two categories: D2D direct and D2D local-
area network (D2D LAN). D2D direct simply refers to the conventional one-hop (one D2D pair) com-
munication [2]. In multi-hop D2D LAN, network-controlled smart devices can realize cluster-based
communication in an ad hoc manner, and meanwhile work over the licensed band to achieve maximal
flexibility and performance in a multi-cell scenario. Fig. 1 shows a typical single cell scenario with
multiple users consisting of conventional cellular communication, one-hop D2D direct transmission, and
D2D LAN for group communication.
Cellular Data signal
eNB
Interference signal
D2D Data signal
D2D!LAN
D2D!LAN
D2D!Direct
D2D!Direct
Fig. 1. D2D communication underlaying cellular networks including cellular communication, D2D direct, and D2D LAN.
3Researchers and wireless engineers postulate that D2D communication will become a key feature
supported by the next generation cellular networks. Based on peer-to-peer data transmission with loosely
controlled radio resource allocation, the D2D communication provides the following advantages: (1)
extended coverage [5], (2) offloading from cellular networks [6], (3) improved energy efficiency, (4)
increased throughput and spectrum efficiency [7], and (5) create opportunities for new services through
mobile social networks and vehicular adhoc networks [8]. D2D communication is allowed to reuse
the same spectrum with cellular services as an underlay, thus improving the system throughput [9],
[10]. With spectrum sharing, although D2D communication can improve spectral efficiency and gain in
system capacity, it also causes interference to the cellular network users. Therefore, methods for efficient
interference management and coordination must be developed to achieve the target performance levels for
both the cellular and D2D users which maximizes the spectrum utilization.
To restrict co-channel interference, the problem of power control for UEs (i.e., D2D UEs or D2D
users) has been studied in the literature [2]. To further improve the gain from intra-cell spectrum reuse,
the problem of pairing the cellular and D2D users for sharing the same radio resources was studied in [11].
[12] provided an analysis on optimum resource allocation and power control between the cellular and
D2D connections. Also, [12] evaluated the performance of the D2D underlaying system in both a single
cell scenario and the Manhattan grid environment. All these work along with many other related work
considered the spectrum reuse of cellular and D2D users from an optimization perspective. That is, all
the users must agree on the same single objective. Also, all the users must be fully controlled through
extensive signaling to achieve such an objective.
Generally, for both D2D direct and D2D LAN, cellular and D2D users may be of self-interest to
maximize their own benefits through cooperation and/or competition in the underlaying D2D network.
This will require the cellular users, D2D users, and the base station (i.e., an eNB in an LTE-A network)
to solve distributed decision problems. Consequently, there is a need to develop suitable solutions to these
problems for efficient D2D communication. In particular, solution approaches are required which will
provide the following:
• Theoretical foundation: a theoretical basis to analyze interactions in multiple player systems,
• Distributed operation: wireless nodes should be able to make their decisions independently using the
local information with small amount of signaling overhead, and
• Mechanism design: the parameters of the models can be designed (or varied) such that they lead the
independent and self-interested wireless nodes toward a system-wide desirable outcome.
4Game theory offers a set of mathematical tools to study complex interactions among interdependent
rational players and predict their choices of strategies. Therefore, game theory becomes a suitable tool
to model and investigate the resource allocation problem for D2D communication. Also, game theoretic
models can be developed to obtain solutions for channel assignment, power control, and cooperation
enforcement among D2D users. In contrast with the existing game-theoretical works on wireless resource
allocation, network controlled D2D communication allows more flexible frequency reuse, and enables more
types of applications, specially for D2D LAN, such that requiring systematic studies of game models. In
this article, we demonstrate how game theory can be applied to study the resource allocation problem for
D2D communication. In addition to reviewing the existing approaches, we also highlight some potential
research directions toward using game theory to address other open problems in D2D communication.
II. BASICS OF D2D COMMUNICATION
In this section, we give an overview of the D2D direct and D2D LAN communication scenarios. For
both types of these communications, the D2D users can access the spectrum in two different ways:
• Overlay spectrum sharing: This approach can completely eliminate intra-cell interference between
cellular services and D2D communication by dividing the licensed spectrum into two parts through
orthogonal channel assignment. One part is a set of channels to be used by the cellular users while
the other part will be used by the D2D users.
• Underlay spectrum sharing: This approach allows D2D users to use the same spectrum simultaneously
with cellular users, increasing spectrum utilization and efficiency. However, the interference among
users must be carefully controlled and avoided.
The overlay approach is easier to realize. However, it results in low spectrum utilization and efficiency as
the different parts of spectrum cannot be flexibly and opportunistically accessed by cellular and D2D users.
On the other hand, the underlay approach requires relatively larger signaling overhead and controlling
information. Nevertheless, it can achieve better system performances due to the frequency reuse with
cellular users.
In this article, we mainly focus on the underlay approach. Fig. 1 shows the network with two tiers, i.e.,
D2D and cellular tiers, and interference in such a network can be classified as follows:
• Cross-tier interference: This is the interference between users in different tiers. The transmission of
an aggressor (e.g., a D2D user) interferes that of a victim (e.g., a cellular user).
5• Co-tier interference: This is the interference between users in the same tier. The transmission of the
aggressor (e.g., a D2D user) interferes that of the victim (e.g., another co-channel D2D user).
Therefore, to reduce the appearance of dead zones (i.e., the zones that users cannot transmit data due to
strong interference) within the cellular networks and successfully enable D2D communication, interference
avoidance, randomization, or cancelation techniques must be effectively applied. For this, the spectrum
allocation needs to consider the interests of the cellular network (operator) and mobile users (cellular
users and D2D users).
Unlike traditional resource allocation in orthogonal frequency-division multiple access (OFDMA) net-
works, the resource allocation in D2D involves the assignment of a D2D user to proper resource blocks (RBs),
which affects the co-channel interference (CCI) from the co-channel cellular user. Specifically, the network
radio resource allocation can be performed in the following ways:
• Local radio resource allocation: The radio resource allocated to cellular users is considered to be
fixed, while that of D2D users can be adjusted.
• Global radio resource allocation: The radio resource of both cellular and D2D users can be controlled
jointly.
Distributed radio resource allocation algorithm can be designed based on game theory [13]. In particular,
a game theory model can be developed to study the interactions between a cellular network, which has
some commodity or service to sell (in this example, the commodity is radio spectrum), and a number
of cellular and D2D users interested in obtaining the service so as to optimize their objective functions,
respectively. To this end, auction theory offers such a set of mathematical tools to design the parameters
of the whole network, so as to efficiently allocate the radio resources for D2D direct communication. One
such model will be elaborated later in this article.
With regards to D2D LAN, the network-controlled mobiles can perform group communication, and
thus, realize various functionalities based on specific application scenario. Similar to D2D direct, these
mobiles in the D2D LAN can also work as an underlay to cellular networks for spectrum reuse. The
scenarios are as follows:
• Group communication: When a large number of similar requests are received by the eNB, the D2D
LAN can be used to efficiently offload data. For example, in stadium or concert networks, when
many mobile users request for the same content, some UEs as ‘seeds’ can be first selected to obtain
the complete information from the eNB, and then these seeds can share the data with the rest of the
mobiles (Fig. 2).
6Fig. 2. Popular content downloading in hotspot areas, such as concert and stadium networks.
• Multi-hop relay communication: When some users are out of the coverage of the eNB, the mobiles
in the D2D LAN can serve as relays for completing the file delivery among mobiles.
• Collaborative smartphone sensing: Smartphones have the capability of environment sensing and the
sensed data can be collaboratively aggregated to some ‘sink’ UEs and then transmitted to the eNB.
Apparently, for D2D LAN, it is essential to form clusters among D2D users, and this problem can
be formulated as a cooperative game. Specifically, a coalition formation algorithm which converges to a
stable solution can be used with a distributed solution. The details will be elaborated later in this article.
III. GAME THEORY-BASED RESOURCE ALLOCATION FOR D2D DIRECT COMMUNICATION
In this section, we discuss different game theoretic models to solve the resource allocation problems
for D2D direct communication. Also, we illustrate an auction-based resource allocation model.
A. Different Game Models for D2D Direct Communication
• Noncooperative power control game: The transmit power of the D2D users must be properly con-
trolled so as to coordinate the interference from D2D communication to a cellular network as well as
the interference among D2D users themselves. Thus, interactions among the self-interested cellular
and D2D users sharing the same channel and controlling the transmit power can be modeled as a
noncooperative game. Specifically, the players are the D2D transmitters, the action is the transmit
power of the D2D transmitter on each channel, and a utility (i.e., payoff) function can be defined
7as the negative of the total transmit power of the D2D transmitter. Multiple D2D users can reuse
the same spectrum with cellular user. Thus, a power control method can be designed by iteratively
updating the transmit power of D2D users in a self-organizing manner [14].
• Stackelberg-type game for local radio resource allocation: With D2D communication underlaying
cellular networks (i.e., D2D users reuse the licensed spectrum of the cellular networks), the concept
of the Stackelberg game is well suited to analyze the radio resource allocation. In [4], a Stackelberg
game is formulated and solved to obtain the transmission strategies of the cellular and D2D users.
Given the hierarchical structure of the Stackelberg game, the players are cellular users (i.e., leaders)
and D2D users (i.e., followers). A cellular user owns the channel and it can charge a D2D user some
fees for accessing the channel. The fees are fictitious money to coordinate and control transmissions
of the D2D user. Thus, the cellular user has an incentive to share the channel with the D2D user if it
is profitable, and the cellular user has the right to decide the price. Given the charging price, the D2D
user can choose the transmit power and channel to maximize its utility. The utility of the cellular
user can be defined as its own throughput plus the revenue that it earns from the D2D user. The fee
(i.e., price) should be decided according to the cellular user’s (i.e., leader’s) own consideration. For
the D2D user as a follower, the utility is the difference between its throughput and the cost that it
pays to the cellular user for using the channel. An equilibrium can be reached by both the leader
and the follower.
• Auction-based model for radio resource allocation: Auction theory is one branch of game theory
which is widely used in trading if the price of a commodity and service is undetermined. There are
many possible designs (or sets of rules) for an auction. The typical issues in the auction include
the efficiency of a given auction design, optimal and equilibrium bidding strategies, and revenue
comparison. Some typical auctions include the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auction, share auction,
double auction, and combinatorial auction.
Specifically, the combinatorial auction (CA)-based resource allocation mechanism allows an agent (bid-
der) to place bids on combinations of resources, called “packages”, rather than just individual resource
block (RB). The CAs motivate the bidders to fully express their preferences, which is beneficial for
improving system efficiency and auction revenues. The auctioneer announces an initial price for each
item, and then the bidders submit to the auctioneer their bids at the current price. As long as the
demand exceeds the supply, or the supply exceeds the demand, the auctioneer updates (raises or
reduces) the corresponding price and the auction goes to the next round. The overall gain, which
8includes the total gain of the auctioneer and all bidders, does not depend on the pay price, but is equal
to the sum of the allocated packages. Note however that pricing is not a typical aim in CA-based
resource allocation mechanism, but the efficiently allocation. Pricing is used as a tool to achieve the
maximum revenue for the auctioneer.
The CA game can be used for resource allocation among D2D links reusing the same cellular channels
with the objective of optimizing the system capacity. In particular, with an iterative combinatorial
auction (ICA), the bidders submit multiple bids iteratively and the auctioneer computes the provisional
allocations and asks the prices in each auction round [10]. In the following section, we will present
a combinatorial auction-based approach for resource allocation for D2D direct communication.
Table I summarizes the game theoretic approaches used for radio resource allocation of D2D direct
communication. Typically, noncooperative game approaches result in suboptimal solutions but have smaller
signaling overhead in comparison to cooperative methods. Nevertheless, the auction game can obtain near
optimal performance at the cost of certain signaling overhead between the D2D users and cellular networks.
TABLE I
SUMMARY OF RESOURCE ALLOCATION GAME MODELS FOR D2D DIRECT COMMUNICATION
Application Game model Solution
Power control
Noncooperative static game [14]: Cellular and D2D
users as players
Power allocation for D2D or all users
by iterative step update algorithm
Local radio resource al-
location
Stakelberg game [4]: Cellular user as leaders and D2D
users as followers
Channel allocation for D2D users by
iterative best response algorithm
Global radio resource
allocation
Combinatorial auction [10]: Cellular networks as bid-
ders and D2D users as auctioneer
Channel allocation for all users by it-
erative bid update algorithm
B. Combinatorial Auction-Based Resource Allocation
The system consists of one eNB, multiple cellular users that receive signals from the eNB, and multiple
D2D users using licensed spectrum resources. Since the D2D users share the same spectrum resources with
cellular users, the cross-tier co-channel interference must be carefully controlled to optimize the network
performance. Accordingly, appropriate channels allocated to the cellular users should be assigned to the
D2D users to minimize the interference and achieve a higher system sum-rate. Basically, we treat the
allocation of multiple D2D users with all cellular users’ channels as the combinatorial auction-based
resource allocation mechanism. The mechanism allows an agent (bidder), which is a cellular network, to
9place bids on combinations of resources rather than just individual RB to an auctioneer. [10] proposes
the reverse iterative combinatorial auction (R-I-CA) for channel allocation of D2D communication with
multiple users. The key components of the combinatorial auction are
• Auctioneers: Cellular and D2D users;
• Bidders: Cellular networks;
• Utility: The difference between the sum-rate that can achieve through the allocated channels and the
cost incurred due to signaling overhead.
In the auction, all the spectrum resources are considered as a set of RBs. The cellular networks as
the bidders compete to obtain the demand (i.e., to sell their RBs) to the cellular and D2D users. In this
case, the demand of the cellular network is considered as the “package” and will be auctioned off as the
commodity in each auction round. The total spectrum is divided into RBs, each of which is allocated to
one cellular user to transmit data. By the auction game, the spectrum units are also assigned to packages,
with each package consisting of at least one mobile user. In other words, the cellular networks compete
to obtain demand from mobile users for improving their own benefits. Although the cellular network as
the bidder can gain revenue from mobile users, there exist some costs due to the transmission of control
signals and overhead due to information feedback. Bidder’s utility quantifies satisfaction of the bidder
getting the package from mobiles, and the outcome of the auction is the spectrum allocation, which
allocates a corresponding package to each bidder.
During the auction game, the mobile user as the auctioneer first announces an initial price for each RB.
Then the bidders submit to the auctioneer their bids at the current price. As long as the demand exceeds
the supply, or on the contrary the supply exceeds the demand, the auctioneer updates (raises or reduces)
the corresponding price, and the auction proceeds to the next round. The allocation can be determined
by multiple iterations, which continues until all the user links are auctioned off or every channel wins a
package to reach the equilibrium solution. This combinatorial auction game has three important properties:
• Convergence: the number of iterations to reach the solution is finite.
• Price monotonicity: the raising item prices in a round can reflect the competitive situation, which
brings efficiency improvement.
• Complexity: the complexity of the auction-based scheme is O(n (2m − 1) + t), where the number of
items to be allocated is m, the number of bidders is n, and the total number of iterations is t.
For a single cell environment Fig. 1 shows some simulation results based on the parameters in Table II
to illustrate the performance of the proposed R-I-CA algorithm. Fig. 3 shows the system sum-rate with
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TABLE II
SIMULATION PARAMETERS
Parameter Value
Cellular layout Isolated cell, 1-sector
Cell radius 500 m
Maximum D2D pair distance 20 m
Cellular UE’s transmit power P c 23 dBm
D2D’s transmit power P d 23 dBm
Noise power -104 dBm
Noise figure 7 dB
Path-loss model ITU UMi
Small-scale fading Rayleigh fading coefficient with zero
mean and unit variance
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Fig. 3. System sum-rate for different allocation algorithms.
different numbers of D2D users using the combinatorial auction in comparison with random resource
allocation and all cellular mode cases. Fig. 3 shows that when the number of D2D pair increases, the
performance of the R-I-CA algorithm first increases before it is saturated. The reason is that a large
number of D2D pairs will result in high co-tier interference as a result of which the bidders stop buying
resources due to the unaffordable purchasing price. Fig. 3 also shows that the random allocation is a worse
option than making all the mobiles to adopt the traditional cellular mode (i.e., all the mobiles connect to
the eNB), which may cause both co-tier and cross-tier interferences.
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IV. GAME THEORY MODELS FOR D2D LOCAL AREA NETWORKS
For resource allocation of group communication and multi-hop relay communication in D2D LANs,
cooperative game models will be more suitable than the noncooperative approach. In the noncooperative
approach, each mobile makes individual decisions, which may lead to severe interference. However,
with a cooperative approach, the mobiles cooperate with each other to maximize its utility function, and
consequently, a better network performance can be achieved.
In a cooperative game, players are able to make contracts which are mutually beneficial. The players
cooperate to maximize a common objective of their coalition, and can coordinate strategies to agree on
how the total payoff is to be divided among themselves. The coalitional game and Nash bargaining game
are two major types of cooperative games. In the following, we will discuss how the coalitional games
can be applied for resource allocation in D2D LANs. Also, we illustrate a coalitional game model for
content distribution based on D2D communication.
A. Coalition Formation Game Models for D2D Communication
• Coalition formation game for group communication:
In the coalition formation game, a set of players (i.e., D2D users) intend to form cooperative groups
(i.e., coalitions). A coalition represents an agreement among the players to act as a single entity
formed by players to gain a higher payoff, and the worth of this coalition is called a coalitional
value. Two common forms of coalitional games are strategic form and partition form. In the strategic
form, the value of a coalition depends on the members of that coalition only. In the partition form,
the value of a coalition also depends on how the other players outside the coalition are structured.
Coalitional game models can be developed with either transferable payoff or nontransferable payoff.
In a transferable payoff coalitional game, utility serves like money and can be alloted to different
players. In a nontransferable payoff coalitional game, different players have different interpretation
of utilities, and the utilities cannot be distributed among players arbitrarily.
For the strategic-form coalitional formation games, a typical algorithm is the merge-and-split algo-
rithm with the two following operations:
– Merge: Coalitions merge to a single coalition whenever mutual benefits exist.
– Split: A coalition splits whenever this splitting can provide better payoffs.
It has been proved that the merge-and-split algorithm will always converge to a set of stable coalitions,
in which no individual player has interests in changing coalition through a merge or split operation
12
to achieve a higher utility.
• Coalition graph game for multi-hop relay communication: The concept of user relaying can be ex-
ploited to cope with the unreliable wireless links (due to both deep fading and co-channel interference)
in a D2D LAN. A coalitional graph game can be used to model multi-hop D2D relaying. In this
model, the utility functions of players are related to the specific graph that interconnects them to
achieve specific objective, e.g., successful transmission rate or coverage extension. The mobiles as the
relays form a directed tree graph to improve their utility by considering packet successful transmission
rate by properly selecting the appropriate route and power level. In the game, the interactions can be
represented by a directed graph G(V, E) with V denoting the set of all nodes (the mobiles and eNBs)
and E denoting the set of all edges (eNB-to-mobile links and D2D links). For any i, j ∈ V , we say
the link from i to j exists, if ei,j ∈ E . For any mobile i ∈ N , only positive utility can be extracted
from both the effective segments received from and transmitted to other mobiles, which depends on
the current links associated with mobile i. Then, the utility function becomes a graph-based function,
denoted by Ui(G). Many algorithms, such as the myopic dynamics algorithm, can be applied for the
coalitional graph game, which results in a directed graph that coordinates the transmissions in the
network [15].
• Overlapping coalition formation game and incentive mechanism for collaborative smartphone sens-
ing: The smartphones today not only provide simple communication services, but also can be used
to sense and collect data from the ambient environment. However, the quality and quantity of the
sensed data uploaded by the users may not always satisfy the applications’ requirements due to the
lack of sufficient number of participating users. In order to encourage the mobiles to contribute their
resources to the sensing tasks, cooperative games can be utilized in which D2D users can collaborate
with each other to form coalitions and distribute their resources to different coalitions. Since each
task can be accomplished by multiple users, and each user can be involved in multiple tasks, the
coalitions representing different sensing tasks may overlap with each other. Therefore, this is an
overlapping coalition formation game [16], [17]. In the coalition-based smartphone sensing scheme,
each user is seen as a player and the distributions of RBs in different coalitions are the possible
strategies. Each coalition can be described by using both coalition members and RBs invested by
each coalition member. The users are paid in certain forms by the coalitions based on their resource
allocation.
• Matching and contract theory tools for mobile social D2D networks: Performance of peer-to-peer
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communication in a D2D LAN can be improved by exploiting the social relationship of the D2D
users. In this case, resource management methods need to jointly optimize a social network layer
and D2D LAN layer to improve the network performance. Game theoretical tools from matching
theory and contract theory, which can incorporate the characteristics of both layers for an optimization
problem, can be used to develop optimal methods for resource allocation.
Table III summarizes the different game approaches for D2D LAN.
TABLE III
SUMMARY OF GAME-THEORETIC METHODS IN D2D LAN
Application Game Model Solution
Group communication
Coalitional game [8]: Players are mobiles and eNB,
and coalition value is the sum rate
Joint channel allocation and mobile se-
lection by merge-and-split algorithm
Multi-hop relay com-
munication
Coalition graph game [15]: Vertexes are eNBs and
mobiles, and edges include eNB-to-mobile links and
D2D links
Power and route allocation by myopic
dynamics algorithm
Collaborative
smartphone sensing
Overlapping coalition formation game [16]: Coalition
consists of coalition members (players) and the re-
source units
Physical resource allocation by convex
optimization
Mobile social D2D net-
work
Joint optimization for social network and D2D layers Contract theory or matching theory
In the following section, we elaborate on a coalition graph-based resource allocation method for D2D
LAN communication for a content distribution application.
B. Coalitional Game-Based Resource Allocation for Efficient Content Distribution
Driven by commercial interests, popular content distribution, as one of the key services in many
hotspots such as stadium networks or concert networks, has recently received considerable attention.
In this subsection, we focus on one most representative scenario: group communication. Fig. 2 presents
a simple scenario to distribute a popular file to D2D LAN through traditional cellular networks. We
introduce the use of a coalitional game for efficient content dissemination. In this scenario, N users want
the same file from the Internet, while only K ‘seeds’ have already downloaded it. Instead of using more
RBs to download the file directly from the eNB, the rest N −K ‘normal’ UEs can ask the seeds to send
the file using D2D communication. The performance of this approach is determined by which RBs are
selected and with which D2D links they share their RBs [8].
14
0 15 30 45 60 75 90
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Time / slots
Po
ss
es
se
d 
pa
ck
et
s 
/ p
er
ce
nt
ag
e
 
 
the proposed approach
the non−cooperative approach
Fig. 4. Total possessed packets by the proposed coalition game-theoretic approach and the noncooperative approach.
A coalition formation game can be employed in this scenario, which consists of the following compo-
nents:
• Players: N D2D UEs and M cellular UEs.
• Coalition: Each coalition contains one and only one cellular UE. The rest of members are the D2D
UEs using the same RB.
• Coalition Value: In a specific coalition, the seeds and the normal UEs form D2D links between each
other. The coalition value is the sum rate of all the D2D links and the cellular link.
Since each coalition uses a different RB, the links in different coalitions do not interfere with each other,
and thus, the coalition formation game has a strategic form. The algorithm for this game can be based
on a ‘switch’ operation, which describes that a player may leave the current coalition and join a new
coalition if the total value of both coalitions is strictly increased. The switch operation can be simply seen
as a combination of a split and a merge. As the total value of the entire system is strictly increased by
each switch operation, we can expect a set of stable coalitions in which no switch operation is preferred.
In Fig. 4, it shows the cumulative service curves of both proposed coalition game-theoretic approach
and noncooperative approach. First, we can see that the proposed approach performs much better than
the noncooperative approach. In the noncooperative approach, each mobile makes individual decisions,
which may lead to severe data collisions. However, in the proposed approach, the mobiles cooperate with
each other to maximize the utility function, and consequently, the proposed approach achieves a better
15
performance in service rate.
V. POTENTIAL RESEARCH DIRECTIONS IN DESIGNING GAME THEORETIC METHODS FOR D2D
COMMUNICATION
Game theoretical tools can be used to address many other resource allocation problems for D2D
communication. Several potential research directions are outlined below.
A. Device-to-Device Direct Communication
• Cooperative game models for multi-cell optimization: In practice, D2D communication may take
place in multiple cells as the mobiles in each D2D pair can be associated with different eNBs. This
can further save transmission time slots compared with single-cell case. In a single-cell case, D2D
direct communication takes one time slot while traditional cellular communication needs two time
slots. As a result, this requires proper coordination among several base stations or eNBs. Therefore,
cooperative game models can be used to achieve multi-cell optimization and intercell interference
coordination. Furthermore, additional time delay needs to be taken into account as an extra cost due
to the signalling exchange among the eNBs.
• Evolutionary game models for load balancing: In D2D communication, each mobile can operate in
two modes: cellular and D2D modes. In the cellular mode, the mobile communicates with an eNB. In
the D2D mode, the mobile transfers data among each other directly. The users have choices to operate
either in D2D or cellular mode. There are many factors related to such mode selection including the
distance between users, transmission quality to the eNB, interference conditions and performance
requirements. Distributed selection of transmission modes of the D2D users (i.e., cellular mode or
D2D communication mode) will be required for a scalable implementation of D2D networks. In this
context, the use of evolutionary game models to balance the traffic for cellular and D2D users is
worth studying.
• Multi-level game models for cross-layer design: For D2D communication, the cross-layer optimization
problem of OFDMA networks becomes more complicated, where multiple D2D users are allowed
to coexist with one cellular user as an underlay. Hence, how to effectively coordinate space, time,
frequency, power, and device is a challenging issue. For joint allocation of multiple resources, multi-
level game models can be developed. For instance, a noncooperative game model can be applied for
power allocation, while in the upper level, an auction game can be used to assign radio resources.
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• Differential game models for energy efficiency: One major benefit of short-range D2D communication
is high energy efficiency, which can save battery power to increase handset life time, and can also
detour the traffic from the eNBs to save their transmit power for green communication. To study the
tradeoff between the total transmit power and system throughput, a differential game model can be
readily utilized for analysis and design of a hybrid network.
B. Device-to-Device Local Area Networks
• Incentive mechanism for cooperative D2D communication: Cooperative D2D LAN communication
can utilize a mobile as a helper relay to extend coverage, or improve spatial diversity through
the information exchange between mobiles. Hence, it would be desirable to provide incentive for
intermediate nodes to participate in the cooperation process, e.g., when mobiles are out of the service
coverage but need other mobiles to forward information. In this case, a rewarding system regarding
proper payment transfer should be developed to motive the collaboration among mobiles, and a
contract game can be a good option.
• Matching game models for mobile crowdsourcing-based applications: For crowdsourcing applications,
collaborative D2D communication and network can obtain needed services, ideas, or content by
soliciting contributions from an online community. Each contributor adds a small portion of its
own initiative to the greater result. Application examples such as multi-file sharing among mobiles,
and collaborative indoor localization and navigation. Consequently, matching theory models can be
adopted by assigning different mobiles to the corresponding interested targets, and coordinate the
resource allocation process, such as to provide a mechanism to generate cost-effective alternatives to
those expensive centralized solutions
VI. CONCLUSION
Game theory has been used to model and analyze the noncooperative and cooperative behaviors of
mobile users in the context of D2D communication underlaying cellular networks. The game theoretic
models are useful for designing radio resource allocation algorithms to achieve stable and efficient
solutions by allowing D2D users efficiently reuse licensed spectrum of cellular users. In this article,
we have discussed different game models developed for allocating radio resources for D2D direct and
D2D LAN scenarios. These models have been categorized based on the types of games. For D2D direct
communication, noncooperative game and auction game models are suitable to solve the resource allocation
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problems. For D2D LANs, collaboration among mobiles is required, and thus, cooperative game models
such as the coalition formation games can be used. We have presented an auction model and a coalitional
game model in detail. We have also outlined potential research directions on developing game theoretic
models to solve several important radio resource management problems for D2D communication.
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